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Abstract: 
Being R&D intensive has traditionally been seen as an impediment to outsourcing. 
This study confirms that empirically this was the case for a set of manufacturing 
industries in the Netherlands in the early 1990s but also shows that R&D intensity 
became a positive predictor for changes in outsourcing levels over the 1990s, 
suggesting firms in R&D intensive industries have increasingly started to rely on 
partnership relations with outside suppliers. This confirms the need to move the 
analysis from scale, opportunism and appropriation concerns to a relational 
perspective when studying outsourcing in R&D intensive industries. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms no longer are what they used to be, appears to have become the 
communis opinio among practitioners and academics alike when it comes to the 
newly emerging vertical structures of high-tech firms. More extensive outsourcing of 
activities, including activities in the manufacturing and product development realms, 
has led to more nimble and leaner firms, so the argument often starts (Domberger, 
1998; Quinn, 2000). To compensate for the loss of internal technological capabilities, 
however, firms increasingly rely on partnering relations with outside suppliers that 
can act as an effective substitute to the internal generation of knowledge and 
innovation (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993; 
Kinder, 2003; Nooteboom, 1999; Quinn, 2000). Yet, through all the anecdotal 
evidence on leading manufacturing firms supporting these statements, it is unclear 
whether such changes in outsourcing policy have indeed taken on broader 
significance to the extent that R&D intensive industries have been engaged in large-
scale outsourcing efforts. 
 It has long been argued that a high R&D intensity should lead to lower levels 
of outsourcing (Harrigan, 1985; Stigler, 1951; Williamson, 1985). In R&D intensive 
industries scale advantages are usually sufficient to allow for more vertical integration 
(Harrigan, 1985; Stigler, 1951). Furthermore innovative activities may be harder to 
appropriate if they are not performed inside the firm (Teece, 1986; Pisano, 1990). And 
there can be an increased risk of opportunism under these conditions, especially 
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where the R&D concerned is of a proprietary rather than a generic nature 
(Williamson, 1985). Yet an alternative, relational view has arisen, which predicts 
outsourcing levels should be on the rise in the context of R&D intensive firms, since 
there is increasing inter-sector technological specialization and buyer-supplier 
relations have become more effective vehicles for exchanging technological know-
how (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kinder, 2003; Quinn, 2000). It 
has been suggested that in the face of severe technological change (Afuah, 2001) or if 
heterogeneity among firms is a substantial driver of the competitive process (Barney, 
1999) vertical integration can instill rigidity into technological trajectories. 
Furthermore the widening range of technologies needed to produce products like 
aircraft engines forces firms to look to outside suppliers for an increasing part of their 
innovative needs (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001). Thus there is now no 
conceptual agreement on the relation between R&D intensity and outsourcing. 
 This article attempts to tackle this controversy in the outsourcing and 
technology literatures by empirically unraveling the relationship between R&D 
intensity and outsourcing. Its central contention is that R&D intensity is no longer a 
negative predictor of outsourcing because firms in high-tech industries increasingly 
use cooperative relations with outside suppliers to obtain technology in areas that they 
know of but are not themselves specialized in. By investigating outsourcing both as a 
state variable, in terms of how much a firm relies on external suppliers for producing 
its goods, and as a flow variable, in terms of changes in that external reliance, static 
and dynamic effects are captured. The two rival theoretical explanations are 
contrasted. An empirical test of 52 manufacturing industries in the Netherlands 
provides support for the traditional argument initially but also shows how the 
relational has gained impetus over the 1990s and is now more valid, implying R&D 
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intensive industries were originally more vertically integrated but have outsourced a 
substantial amount of activities and are now less integrated than other industries. This 
casts substantial doubt over the tenability of the conventional argument and suggests 
the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) is more appropriate. 
 The second section of the article discusses the current stock of knowledge on 
outsourcing in the management and applied economics literature, focusing in 
particular on how R&D is believed to influence make-or-buy decisions. It also puts 
forward two hypotheses. Section three discusses developments in outsourcing in the 
Netherlands over the 1990s and presents the empirical data underlying this study. In 
the fourth section these data are used to test the hypotheses through regression 
models. The conclusions, in section five, center on the theoretical implications, in 
terms of our understanding of when (not) to outsource and on the policy implications, 
particularly how the changing nature and extent of outsourcing forces managers and 
policy makers to rethink existing practices. 
 
 
2. Outsourcing and its predictors 
The make-or-buy or outsourcing decision has been the subject of substantial analysis 
in economics and management. While this is neither the place nor is there enough 
space to fully review this area here, it is useful to recapture some of the main 
arguments and findings. In particular various attempts have been made to construct 
contingency models that help explain under which conditions outsourcing is a 
beneficial solution. Transaction cost economics clearly is one such model that predicts 
(Williamson, 1981, 1985) outsourcing occurs under conditions of low asset 
specificity, low uncertainty and a low frequency of transactions. When transactions 
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employ highly specific assets markets fail due to pressures for opportunism, forcing 
firms to internalize transactions (Walker and Weber, 1984). Similarly if a certain asset 
is required frequently, the transaction cost disadvantages of the market will increase 
and internalization occurs. Uncertainty, for instance in the form of volume or profit 
margin fluctuations, will induce the same effect, since contracts with suppliers will be 
imperfect, making external contracting less attractive. This effect of uncertainty is 
strongest in the simultaneous presence of asset specificity (Williamson, 1985). 
Williamson (1981) originally also argued that technological uncertainty, like volume 
uncertainty, would lead to vertical integration. Yet this has not been consistently 
confirmed in empirical research (Walker and Weber, 1984). More recently, 
Williamson‟s stance on this has changed somewhat in that technological uncertainty 
is no longer seen as a significant predictor of outsourcing (Williamson, 1996). But 
technological uncertainty is not quite the same as R&D intensity, the focus of this 
article, as will be discussed shortly. There is of course also a literature linking 
different types of innovation to organizational forms (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Brusoni et al, 2001) but that is not within the scope of this article. 
Measurement and information approaches (Milgrom and Roberts, 1987) point 
at monitoring problems and information differentials between buyer and supplier as 
explanations of outsourcing. If a supplier‟s behavior cannot be appropriately 
monitored, this will stimulate vertical integration. Likewise the existence of 
substantial information differences, when the supplier knows things the buyer does 
not know, will induce vertical integration. Another type of explanation of outsourcing 
focuses more on analysis of the capabilities of the firm. The knowledge-based (Grant, 
1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992) and resource-based (Barney, 1999; Quinn, 2000) 
explanations of outsourcing suggest that a firm will outsource those activities in 
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which it is not particularly specialized or that are „non-core‟ because the firm is less 
capable of performing those activities. So rather than invoking a market failure 
explanation, this suggests firms may fail in certain respects. When there is such „firm 
failure‟ outsourcing will come into play. Applying real options theory Leiblein and 
Miller (2003) argue that whether to outsource an activity or not can also be a 
consequence of the likelihood of that activity becoming a platform for future growth. 
In addition some scholars have pointed at the influence of the institutional 
environment on outsourcing. Toulan (2001) related increases in outsourcing to 
liberalization of the economy because liberalization provides more freely operating 
markets. This closely follows the institutional voids argument of Khanna and Palepu 
(2000), who argue that internalization of activities can be a consequence of the lack of 
properly functioning institutions in a country. Relational rent (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
and trust (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998) arguments suggest that establishing 
long-term, trusting, and idiosyncratic relations with certain suppliers can provide 
above average returns, which may also act as an incentive to outsource these 
activities. Very briefly these are some of the main arguments in the outsourcing area.  
 
2.1 Innovation and R&D 
For the purposes of this article, however, it makes sense to discuss in some more 
detail the relation between R&D intensity and outsourcing. R&D intensity is normally 
defined as research and development expenditures divided by sales and is a strong 
correlate for the innovative output of the firm (Colombo and Garrone, 1996; Greve, 
2003). At this point it is necessary to elaborate upon the difference between 
technological uncertainty, which is one of the variables originally included in 
transaction cost economics-based explanations of outsourcing (Williamson, 1981), 
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and R&D intensity. Empirically there is probably a positive correlation between R&D 
intensity and technological uncertainty, since disruptive technological change is more 
likely to substantially impact firms‟ business models in technologically intense 
industries and because R&D expenditures generate new technologies and therefore 
technological upheaval in the industry. But this correlation is nowhere near perfect. 
Many industries that are not technologically intensive, in the sense of substantial 
R&D investments, have faced much disruptive technological change in the internet 
era. This holds true both for retailers like Barnes & Noble in its battle with Amazon 
and for many office environments, including for instance business schools. 
Furthermore R&D intensity can be measured at a distinct moment in time while 
technological uncertainty by definition refers to future technological flows that cannot 
be predicted well nor actually measured with as much accuracy. In conclusion R&D 
intensity will primarily be interpreted here as an input measure for innovative activity. 
Thus while I do not suggest R&D is the same as innovation I do maintain that R&D is 
performed in order to generate innovations, particularly of the technological type. 
While the existing literature has put forward some anecdotal evidence and conceptual 
discussions that relate innovation to outsourcing (Kinder, 2003; Williamson, 1985; 
Quinn, 2000), no large-scale empirical test appears to exist. 
 The wider literature on technological change provides some additional clues 
that can help us understand the R&D-outsourcing relationship. Dosi (1997) has for 
instance noted that technological change is a process driven by both factors inside the 
firm and outside sources of knowledge like suppliers, who usually provide knowledge 
complementary to that of the outsourcing firm, in areas where it may not be well-
versed, an argument akin to that of Dyer and Singh (1998). Malerba and Orsenigo ( 
1993) have argued in line with TCE that in industries with highly complex products 
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appropriability will be low and tacit knowledge will be abundant and therefore 
vertical integration will usually be the preferred solution. Using Pavitt‟s classification 
of industries, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) further stated that scale-based industries 
are also strongly vertically integrated. Patel and Pavitt (1997) showed that many 
firms, particularly large multinationals, hold competences across a wide range of 
technologies. In later work Pavitt and colleagues (Brusoni et al., 2001) used this 
notion to suggest that firms know more than they make, implying that components 
and materials that could potentially be made by the firm are in fact outsourced, a 
useful extension of the resource-based argument discussed earlier. Cantwell and 
Santangelo (1999) found that while much of R&D spending is highly localized in the 
parent company, there are some instances of sourcing abroad. These appear dictated 
either by supply-side factors, with certain knowledge only being available in one or a 
few foreign clusters, or by the ability of large multinational firms to develop a global 
knowledge exploration network inside and around the firm. Thus the technological 
change literature, while not being very specific on how innovation, and R&D intensity 
in particular, ought to influence outsourcing levels, has developed useful notions on 
the implications of the type of product and industry for sourcing behavior. I will now 
build two contrasting hypotheses to link R&D investment levels to outsourcing levels. 
The first builds upon conventional insights, mostly drawn from economics, and the 
second brings in more recent findings from the management literature. 
 
2.2. The conventional argument on innovation and outsourcing 
 Conventional industrial organization (IO) accounts of vertical integration 
(Stigler, 1951) tend to stress how it is used as a means to enhance the scale of 
operations and bargaining power. Technologically intensive industries normally favor 
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a large operating scale because R&D investments are mostly fixed costs that can be 
recuperated more easily at high revenue levels. The marginal costs of production are 
relatively low in technologically intensive industries. Thus a technologically intensive 
industry can be expected to be dominated by one or a few firms that employ 
substantial amounts of backward vertical integration to maximize the scale of 
operations. More recent observers in the IO tradition (Harrigan, 1985; Porter, 1980) 
seem to concur that where R&D matters, vertical integration is preferred over 
outsourcing. 
In transaction cost economics Williamson‟s (1985: 141-144) discussion on the 
role of innovation in vertical integration decisions brings to light several arguments 
favoring integration under conditions of substantial innovation but also includes some 
discussion concerning hybrid agreements as a solution. The key advantage of 
integration is that it promotes cooperation between stages. On the other hand it will 
compromise the high-powered incentives available in markets because costs and 
benefits will tend to be shared between the purchasing and supply stages in an 
integrated setting (Williamson, 1985). Additionally there may be instances of higher-
level intrusion or accounting manipulation that can further distract from such 
incentives. The latter, however, will exist to a larger degree in markets where 
opportunistic behavior is more common. Williamson (1985) concludes that where 
innovation is of a proprietary rather than a generic type it will lead to integration or at 
the very least partial ownership (hybrid forms), particularly when combined with a 
need for specific assets. He further suggests that non-specific assets will normally 
only lead to generic innovation. Thus there appears to be a positive correlation 
between proprietary innovations and specific assets. This further suggests that if R&D 
is undertaken in-house it must be aimed at producing some type of proprietary 
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innovation for the firm and should generally be associated with vertical integration 
according to Williamson. Teece (1986) has added that when the R&D intensity of a 
sector is high, it will be more prone to integrate activities into the firm rather than to 
outsource them in order to protect intellectual property rights. Pisano (1990) similarly 
argued that appropriation problems around knowledge, like that obtained from R&D, 
lead to vertical integration, as did Malerba and Orsenigo (1993). 
 Monteverde (1995) discussed the application of transaction cost economics in 
the exchange of technical engineering knowledge. He investigated empirically how 
unstructured technical dialog, one form of human asset specificity, affects outsourcing 
decisions. Because organizations can internally develop a specific dialect for 
exchanging unstructured and tacit knowledge, they are much more efficient at 
transferring this type of knowledge. Therefore the costs of transacting are 
substantially lower inside the organization and vertical integration is the preferred 
solution. Note that the latter observation, that organizations can be more efficient 
carriers of knowledge than markets, takes Monteverde‟s work closer to the 
knowledge-based explanation of Kogut and Zander (1992), which argues governance 
forms are less a result of market failure than one of organizational superiority in 
certain types of transactions. 
 In sum this conventional view suggests that innovation is created more 
efficiently inside firms than through markets. Outsourcing is not a means to innovate 
because outside suppliers lack incentives to innovate for the buying firm. Where they 
do innovate, it will be hard for the buying firm to appropriate the rents of innovations 
(Teece, 1986) as the supplier will seek to use it for a wide range of clients. Thus 
dedicated innovation is particularly hard to achieve under an outsourcing regime. All 
of this suggests that when R&D is an important part of an industry‟s value chain, 
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firms in that industry will integrate more activities and outsource fewer, which best 
summarizes this view on R&D and outsourcing. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The R&D intensity of an industry is a negative predictor of its 
extent of outsourcing. 
 
2.3. A relational view of innovation and outsourcing 
To provide an explanation for the recent changes in the supply chain strategies of 
firms discussed in the introduction a different conceptual perspective is in order. For 
if R&D intensity and outsourcing are as incompatible as suggested above, how can we 
explain the rises in outsourcing in R&D intensive environments that have been 
reported (Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Quinn, 2000)? This other perspective, which is 
here coined a relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), argues that much of a firm‟s 
innovation now occurs in conjunction with outside suppliers rather than inside the 
firm. Because developments in non-core technology areas have become very rapid, it 
is no longer feasible to keep up with all of these technologies in as much detail as 
needed (Brusoni et al, 2001; Quinn, 2000). Therefore outside technology sources are 
in many instances the only option for firms that wish to keep up-to-date (Hagedoorn, 
1993). Barney (1999) has suggested that firms need not necessarily own all relevant 
capabilities, as long as they have sufficient access to them. Such access may well be 
obtained through relations with outside suppliers. 
Brusoni et al (2001) have noted that among manufacturing firms knowledge is 
now becoming more extensive than needed for the activities performed inside the 
firm. In other words, firms must know more than they make in order to be able to 
integrate the inputs of various specialist outside suppliers. The more uneven rates of 
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technological change in underlying components and the more often the 
interdependencies between components change, the more slack knowledge the buying 
firm needs to maintain (Brusoni et al, 2001). Nishiguchi (1994) has argued that the 
use of outside suppliers creates the option to access a much larger productive network 
and knowledge pool. This network provides much-needed flexibility to cope with 
changes in demand and helps to lower time-to-market substantially. Afuah (2001) 
further suggested that over the life cycle of a technology firms are best off by 
gradually increasing their extent of outsourcing. Only when a radical, competence 
destroying, technological change occurs does it make sense to revert to vertical 
integration into this new technology (Afuah, 2001). 
 In the context of innovation, Langlois and Robertson (1992) have developed 
the notion that it is feasible to develop initial innovation through outsourcing in a 
decentralized network, especially if substantial network externalities are present. If 
outsourcing is to make sense in the context of R&D intensive businesses though, 
relations with suppliers ought to replicate some of the characteristics of firms. For if 
relations are of a strict arm‟s length type, there is no incentive for external suppliers to 
undertake innovative activities on behalf of the buying firm. Dyer and Singh (1998) 
have developed a relational view of rent attainment, which argues that inter-
organizational relations, including buyer-supplier relations, can provide benefits 
similar to hierarchies without the production cost disadvantages associated with 
hierarchies. Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) detail through their case study of Toyota how 
new technology is developed through dedicated buyer-supplier relations. This new 
model of interorganizational relations as a means to innovation is superseding 
traditional in-house development so it is argued (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kinder 2003; 
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Quinn, 2000). This trend ought to be reflected in the outsourcing levels of R&D 
intensive industries, which should rise as a consequence. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The R&D intensity of an industry is a positive predictor of 
changes in its extent of outsourcing. 
 
 
3. Outsourcing in Dutch manufacturing 
Similar to elsewhere outsourcing and increasingly cooperative relations have in the 
1990s been identified as a key trend in the Netherlands (De Wit, Mol & Van Drunen, 
1998; Nooteboom, 1998). Firms in the Netherlands have increased their reliance on 
external suppliers dating back even to the late 1970s but from the early 1990s 
onwards a particularly large shift towards outsourcing occurred (De Wit et al, 1998). 
Where firms previously outsourced secondary and support activities, like catering, 
temporary labor, and other facilities management activities, they now also outsourced 
manufacturing activities. There was increasing technological specialization between 
industries. The production of printed circuit boards (PCBs) for instance, which was 
formerly operated as a small-scale, made-to-order internal activity, was now 
subcontracted to specialized PCB suppliers. Rapid technological developments in 
electronics, mechatronics, and related fields made much of the existing internal 
knowledge on PCBs and other electronic components obsolete and raised the 
production costs because of rising equipment needs. Therefore in many cases non-
specialized firms had little choice but to outsource.  
The nature of the underlying supplier relations had to be altered because the 
newly outsourced activities required more intensive coordination given their 
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sensitivity to overall product outcomes (Nooteboom, 1998). The implementation of 
these changes was sometimes problematic and buyers and suppliers both needed to 
adjust to the changed circumstances. Wynstra and Weggeman (2001) provide some 
evidence that manufacturing firms in the Netherlands have increasingly engaged in 
cooperation with suppliers to produce product innovation. Finally outsourcing also 
took on a more prominent role in the Dutch discourse on management and among 
policy makers. Management consultancy firms published on the topic, government 
institutions became interested in its consequences for local employment and growth, 
academics increasingly wrote about it and all kinds of employers‟ associations, 
training agencies and conference firms organized activities on outsourcing. 
 
3.1. Empirical measures 
The empirical tests, which will be discussed shortly, are based on 3-digit level 
census data of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) on 52 
industries. The 3-digit industry level is specific enough to include a clearly defined 
product, like pharmaceuticals or machine tools, but no so specific as to render the 
number of companies in the industry too small for reliable analysis. The industry 
classification used is the European NACE system, similar to SIC in the United States, 
and all industries included are in manufacturing, ranging from complex assembly to 
simple processing industries. The industry level variables are formed by aggregation 
of business unit level data gathered directly from manufacturing firms. The latter are 
collected on an annual basis and include questions on total sales, external sourcing, 
profitability, R&D expenditures, total exports, and the number of firms, including an 
indication of the nationality of the parent firm. The dependent variable of 
OUTSOURCING is constructed by dividing total external sourcing in the industry in 
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1994 by total sales in the industry in 1994. Therefore it measures to what extent the 
industry relies on external suppliers for the creation of products across all its 
activities, including manufacturing, design and services. This OUTSOURCING 
measure represents the vertical structure of the firm. The accompanying flow variable, 
of OUTSOURCING CHANGE is calculated as the difference between outsourcing in 
1998 and outsourcing in 1994. R&D INTENSITY, the predictor variable, is measured 
as the industry‟s 1993 total R&D expenditures over its 1993 total sales. In these data 
R&D levels are fairly constant across years (inter-year correlations range from 0.75 
upwards). Recent research in the transaction costs strand (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; 
Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 2003) has continued its focus on how a set of predictors 
at a given time influences outsourcing choices at that time. Yet time differences will 
often exist between the presence of R&D intensity and the implementation of 
outsourcing and a one-year time lag between all independent variables and the 
dependent variable, from 1993 to 1994, was introduced to reflect this. In addition any 
claim to causality is much strengthened if the independent variable is measured prior 
to the dependent variable. 
Five control variables are employed in addition to the R&D intensity variable. 
The AVERAGE SIZE variable is the average size of firms in the industry in 1993, 
measured by the average turnover per firm. Larger firms often take on a different role 
in the supply chain, by primarily becoming an assembler and not a producer, and may 
therefore outsource more. The extent of presence of FOREIGN FIRMS is measured 
by dividing the number of foreign subsidiaries over the total number of firms. It is 
conceivable foreign firms have developed a different outsourcing pattern because they 
are less familiar with local suppliers. There is an effect that is known as the „liability 
of foreignness‟ in international management research (Kostova and Zaheer, 1998). 
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Because foreign firms are less familiar with their host environments they will have 
more difficulties than local firms in partnering with local suppliers. Given the higher 
search and evaluation costs for foreign firms, outsourcing is normally a less viable 
option for them. In addition foreign firms have often established themselves in their 
host environment on the basis of some superior set of internal capabilities that may 
help them offset the liability of foreignness (Dunning, 1993). Having such a superior 
set of internal capabilities, for instance human resources, also makes it less likely that 
foreign firms will outsource activities since they will want to fully exploit these 
internal strengths. PRODUCTIVITY is calculated as 1993 total sales divided by the 
1993 total number of employees. In order to become more productive firms in an 
industry probably need to focus on a smaller set of tasks, which they can do by 
outsourcing more. Productivity as measured here, however, relates positively to 
outsourcing because outsourcing normally reduces the number of employees while 
sales remain constant. Productivity is therefore one of the drivers of outsourcing 
decisions and a positive association must be expected. EXPORT INTENSITY is the 
1993 total amount of exports over 1993 total sales. Since the ability to export products 
is an indicator of company strength, more export intensive industries possess more 
internal capabilities and may therefore outsource less. Similar to foreignness, a high 
export intensity reflects the competitive strength of an industry. The more internal 
strengths firms in an industry possess, the less likely they are to outsource. In general, 
competition between firms stimulates outsourcing (Cachon and Harker, 2001). More 
export intensive industries will be faced with a more competitive environment and 
will therefore seek to outsource more.  UNCERTAINTY in the industry is measured 
by the variance in the industry‟s annual return on sales measures over the 1993-1998 
period. The uncertainty-outsourcing relationship was discussed at length above. 
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test the hypothesized relationships 
because the variables are such that it is an efficient and reliable estimator. 
 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
Table 1 below briefly captures the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
key variables. It is worth noting that the average outsourcing level stood at 52.3% of 
sales in 1994 and increased by 3.5% between 1994 and 1998, which is a fairly 
substantial increase. Also note that while the average R&D intensity is not 
particularly high among these industries, about 0.5% of sales, there is substantial 
variance in R&D levels in the sample. Finally observe that there is a negative 
correlation between the outsourcing and outsourcing change variables, implying a 
catching-up effect. Industries that initially outsourced less have now seen substantial 
increases. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert table 1 around here 
------------------------------ 
 
Table 2 investigates the effect of 1993 R&D intensity and a set of control variables on 
the industry average level of outsourcing in 1994. It confirms hypothesis 1: R&D 
intensive industries initially displayed a lower level of outsourcing. Thus the 
conventional perspective, which holds that under conditions of high innovation 
expenditures there are scale, appropriation, and opportunism concerns that make 
outsourcing a less preferred option, did hold true initially. 
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------------------------------ 
Insert table 2 around here 
------------------------------ 
 
Table 2 also provides some interesting findings on the control variables employed. 
The presence of foreign firms is a slightly negative predictor for outsourcing levels, 
which confirms the liability of foreignness argument presented before. As expected 
the productivity of firms, measured as per-employee turnover, is positively related to 
outsourcing. As noted above this is both a strongly intuitive and a mathematically 
determined relation, since firms that produce large volumes with a limited number of 
employees will typically also need to outsource many activities to achieve such 
productivity. In fact, the causality probably runs in two directions: outsourcing 
increases productivity and a desire to increase productivity may be at the heart of 
outsourcing decisions. The average size of firms in the sector is not a significant 
predictor of outsourcing, although the sign is positive. Perhaps the indirect form of 
measurement, using average size of firms in an industry to link that to industry 
outsourcing, disguises size effects though. A study of the size of firms and their 
outsourcing levels could clarify this further. The positive impact of the export 
intensity variable points to the role that having to compete more ferociously, in 
international markets, can play in forcing firms to outsource. Uncertainty is shown to 
be a strongly negative predictor of outsourcing levels, confirming the TCE logic. In 
the presence of substantial uncertainty it is harder to write complete contracts. 
In table 3 the results of the regression analysis on changes in the outsourcing 
level between 1994 and 1998 are displayed. There is a strongly positive relation 
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between R&D intensity in 1993 and subsequent changes in the level of outsourcing. 
Thus the second hypothesis is confirmed in that R&D intensity acted as a positive 
predictor for changes in outsourcing
1
. This confirms what many authors have 
suggested about the changing nature of outsourcing, though the evidence presented 
here is not based on perception data or anecdotal or small-scale evidence. Especially 
in technologically volatile environments where R&D is a key priority, firms have 
increased their reliance on external suppliers. They could do this because of the 
changed nature of underlying technologies and relations with suppliers. The need to 
understand and utilize multiple technologies that cannot all be maintained in-house 
forces firms to outsource more activities than before. Changes in communication 
technologies and the increasing openness of economies increase the rent potential of 
relations with external suppliers, many of them foreign, and permit firms to set up 
closer relations with suppliers than hitherto possible. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert table 3 around here 
------------------------------ 
 
There are two other significant findings in table 3. Foreign firms have not increased 
their extent of outsourcing as much as have local firms, consistent with the logic 
outlined above. Foreign firms will have a lower degree of penetration among local 
                                                 
1
 In fact, a rerun of the analysis presented in table 2 for 1997 R&D intensity and 1998 outsourcing 
revealed that the initially significantly negative relationship between R&D intensity and outsourcing 
turned into a positive one in 1998, albeit not a significantly positive one. This raises several interesting 
questions. First, how has this relationship developed since 1998? It is conceivable that R&D intensity 
has now actually become a positive predictor of outsourcing. Second, what processes allow firms that 
have heavily invested into R&D to outsource many of their activities nonetheless? Third, what remains 
of the predictive value of the traditional perspective outlined above in such a much altered business 
environment? 
 20 
suppliers and will use their internal capabilities as much as possible. Uncertainty is a 
positive predictor of changes in outsourcing levels. This could be construed to imply 
that the predictive power of TCE has been decreasing over time, since more 
uncertainty is no longer associated with more vertical integration. As stated before 
though uncertainty is seen to explain integration particularly effectively in the joint 
presence of asset specificity. Since no asset specificity test was included, it is not 
possible to reach any final conclusion on this point. 
 
4.1 Research limitations and extensions 
In terms of limitations, the number of sampled industries (52) is fairly low which is 
potentially troublesome in the context of running regressions, where some 40 
observations are often seen as a bare minimum and 5 to 10 observations are needed 
per variable to create models with sufficient statistical power. Yet there are several 
reasons to believe the number of observations is not problematic here. First, the 
industry data themselves are aggregates of firm level data, involving thousands of 
firms. Thus any aberrations at the firm level are wielded out through the aggregation 
process and the resulting industry level data are very reliable. Second, the model 
statistics of both models are solid. The F-tests are fairly high and adjusted R
2
 figures 
are also quite satisfactory. Third, more industries become available when omitting the 
focal R&D variable from the regressions, i.e. there are quite a few missing values for 
R&D expenditure in the database. Missing values appear mostly in industries with 
particularly small numbers of firms where industry level R&D data could be traced 
back to individual firms. When rerunning the models for a wider set of some 84 
industries, the other variables in the model maintain their signs and mostly become 
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more significant. Therefore it appears fair to conclude that the results are fairly robust 
in spite of the small number of observations.  
Another data-related problem is the use of R&D intensity as a proxy for 
innovative behavior. While it is suggested that R&D intensity is indeed a close 
correlate of innovation (Greve, 2003), this is not a perfect correlation as noted earlier. 
Indeed R&D intensity could perhaps also be interpreted as one possible measure of 
technological uncertainty, in which case the key point of this article would really be 
that firms have started to outsource more, and particularly do so in the face of high 
technological uncertainty. Regardless of these issues, however, R&D intensity itself is 
worthy of study (Colombo and Garrone, 1996; Greve, 2003) and the nature of its 
relation to outsourcing decisions is informative for strategic decision-making. 
 One variable missing from the equations was asset specificity, for which no 
valid empirical measures were available in the present study. Including asset 
specificity might have provided additional explanatory power. On the other hand, 
asset specificity is likely also positively correlated with R&D intensity as argued 
before. Furthermore it is hard to say what would constitute a proper measure of asset 
specificity across a wide range of transactions at the business unit level, which is how 
both outsourcing and R&D intensity were measured here. Another limitation is that 
the R&D intensity of industries is only one indicator of an industry‟s innovative 
output. And it is not a perfect measure for innovative output either. Thus it could be 
informative to test how other innovation measures, like the number of patents granted, 
are related to the outsourcing behavior of firms. Similarly the empirical context used 
here, the Dutch manufacturing sector, may produce results specific to that sector‟s 
development. Although there are no obvious indications that outsourcing in the 
Netherlands is very different from outsourcing in other OECD countries, there could 
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certainly be differences in timing or degree. A replication elsewhere would be useful. 
Where available firm level data could shed a different and more detailed light on the 
outsourcing-innovation relation than these industry level data, for instance by 
investigating possible interactions with asset specificity, capabilities or firm size. 
Such a trade-off of breadth for depth could generate additional insights. Similarly 
there is merit in applying other outsourcing measures, for instance by linking the 
probability that a specific component will be outsourced given its R&D intensity. The 
results on outsourcing as a firm level concept provided here, however, are not only a 
useful starting point for such further studies but also interesting in their own right. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
A major controversy in the area of outsourcing and innovation is whether R&D 
intensity discourages outsourcing or is compatible with it. This article is the only 
recent test of this relationship with large-scale empirical data. It demonstrated, in the 
empirical context of the Dutch manufacturing sector, that while R&D may historically 
have been a negative predictor of outsourcing there was a clear reversal over the 
1990s. The relational view of outsourcing and innovation, which maintains that 
buyer-supplier relations can be an effective substitute for internal development, thus 
appears to have gained impetus in practice. Alternatively the more humble, and 
probably more correct, perspective is that the relational view appears to be an 
appropriate portrait of empirical reality as it has been developing. Product life cycles 
are becoming shorter and there has been a shift in priorities away from appropriating 
in-house innovations towards developing the ability to rapidly launch new products. 
This kind of ability is often better developed in a buyer-supplier network setting 
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where a more flexible, wider, and larger joint research capacity can be obtained than 
inside a single firm. In terms of the outsourcing literature this article has demonstrated 
that predictors of outsourcing are not necessarily stable over time and that theoretical 
positions may therefore not remain valid indefinitely. In terms of the technological 
change literature, the key point would be that alternative production arrangements of 
innovative products, involving outside suppliers, have become a feasible supplement 
to vertical integration. 
Brusoni et al (2001: 599) stated that: “firms invest in broadening their 
knowledge bases while narrowing down their manufacturing bases”. The evidence 
presented here seems to suggest that the latter aspect, of narrowing down the 
manufacturing base, is moving at a much faster pace than the former, the broadening 
of the knowledge base. Industries in this sample did not significantly raise their R&D 
investments but did increase their dependence on outside suppliers. Further anecdotal 
evidence suggests many Dutch firms have rapidly and thoroughly disengaged from 
activities like the production of printed circuit boards but maintain some basic 
knowledge of such activities. Therefore firms do generally know more than they make 
(Brusoni et al, 2001) and the gap between knowing and making may be on the rise but 
this is mostly due to the fact they are starting to make less than they know and not 
necessarily because their knowledge base widens rapidly. To test this further it could 
be fruitful to find out whether R&D investments in specific subfields are generally 
maintained over longer time periods, even when firms have disengaged from the 
underlying activities. This would require data on R&D spending patterns and specific 
outsourcing patterns, which could perhaps only be obtained when studying one or a 
few cases. It also points to one of the problems associated with outsourcing, which is 
how to maintain sufficient knowledge inside the firm to be able to jointly develop new 
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knowledge with a supplier and at the same time assess the supplier‟s performance. 
Since many instances of outsourcing involve moving people to suppliers much 
knowledge can be lost with the transition. Outsourcing can become a source of serious 
bargaining and learning problems in the long run.  
Firms increasingly outsource activities that are crucial to the competitive 
advantage of the firm. In itself this type of outsourcing can be beneficial, if rents can 
be obtained from the relation. Where such rents are deeply ingrained in the relation 
itself, there are few problems of spillovers. But there is a big question mark over how 
to appropriate such rents in the case of new technology. Technology that is developed 
in conjunction with a supplier may have multiple alternative uses for the supplier but 
none for the buying firm. Technological knowledge is often replicated fairly easily 
within the same supplier firm. Under such circumstances there are serious dangers of 
knowledge leaks to competitors and appropriate governance responses must be found 
unless the value of knowledge stocks in an industry depreciates so fast that this 
knowledge has limited value for competitors by the time it reaches them (Nooteboom, 
1999). Where knowledge leaks occur a need for creating different contracting 
solutions arises in which buyers and suppliers are both provided with incentives to 
innovate and can obtain joint ownership. From a public policy perspective this creates 
pressures for legal protection of joint intellectual property.  
Another key public policy implication of increased outsourcing is how it 
affects underlying technology activities and employment. If R&D intensive industries 
can outsource many more manufacturing and design activities, as now appears to be 
the case, this implies these activities become increasingly footloose. The recent rise of 
global sourcing structures is therefore not limited to activities where cost of labor is 
the key consideration but also appears to start including more innovative activities 
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(Mol, Pauwels, Matthyssens, and Quintens, 2003). For practicing managers global 
sourcing poses different challenges, for instance in terms of how to deal with 
suppliers in institutional and cultural environments different from that of the buyer. 
There are few longitudinal accounts of how outsourcing and R&D intensity 
are related in current literature and none of recent origin. Yet, quite a bit is known 
about technological collaboration between buyer and supplier and what influences 
outsourcing levels at a given point in time. What is needed then, is a more intricate 
understanding of how the R&D-outsourcing relation evolves over time. Some specific 
research questions can be suggested. Under what conditions is a high R&D intensity 
compatible with much outsourcing? Will outsourcing levels be maintained in the face 
of discontinuous technological change (Afuah, 2001)? Answers to these questions 
would be very valuable outcomes of future research. 
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Tables 
 
 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. R&D intensity .4538 .7530 1 -.239 .543** .279* -.036 .205 .141 -.123 
2. Outsourcing 52.29 14.00  1 -.375** -.106 .463** .199 .337** -.306** 
3. Outsourcing change 3.460 6.487   1 -.069 -.165 -.151 -.196 -.054 
4. Foreign firms 32.82 23.60    1 .304** .281* .474** .062 
5. Productivity 334.3 315.6     1 .200 .684** -.165 
6. Export intensity 35.64 17.27      1 .447** .105 
7. Average size 10.42 1.131       1 .004 
8. Uncertainty 2.868 3.676        1 
Table 1: means, standard deviations and correlations among variables. ** Significant 
at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level. N = 84, except for row 1 where N = 52. 
 
 
Variable Unstand. β Standard error t-value significance 
Constant 0.459 0.191 2.399 0.021 
Foreign firms -0.133 0.071 -1.872 0.068 
R&D intensity -0.051 0.019 -2.680 0.010 
Productivity 0.000 0.000 2.814 0.007 
Export intensity 0.002 0.001 2.245 0.030 
Average size 0.004 0.021 0.194 0.847 
Uncertainty -0.017 0.004 -4.537 0.000 
F-value: 10.185 (.000) R
2
: .576 Adjusted R
2
: .519 
Table 2: OLS regression on 1994 industry level of outsourcing. N = 52. 
 
 
Variable Unstand. β Standard error t-value significance 
Constant -0.075 0.103 -0.731 0.469 
Foreign firms -0.066 0.038 -1.729 0.091 
R&D intensity 0.055 0.010 5.356 0.000 
Productivity -0.000 0.000 -1.753 0.086 
Export intensity -0.000 0.000 -0.992 0.326 
Average size 0.014 0.012 1.219 0.229 
Uncertainty 0.005 0.002 2.482 0.017 
F-value: 6.861 (.000) R
2
: .478 Adjusted R
2
: .408 
Table 3: OLS Regression on industry level outsourcing change between 1994 and 
1998. N = 52.  
